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Abstract— Treating the interference as noise in the n−user
interference channel, the paper describes a novel approach to the
rates region, composed by the time-sharing convex hull of 2n − 1
corner points achieved through On/Off binary power control.
The resulting rates region is denoted crystallized rates region.
By treating the interference as noise, the n−user rates region
frontiers has been found in the literature to be the convex hull
of n hyper-surfaces. The rates region bounded by these hyper-
surfaces is not necessarily convex, and thereby a convex hull
operation is imposed through the strategy of time-sharing. This
paper simplifies this rates region in the n−dimensional space by
having only an On/Off binary power control. This consequently
leads to 2n − 1 corner points situated within the rates region.
A time-sharing convex hull is imposed onto those corner points,
forming the crystallized rates region. The paper focuses on game
theoretic concepts to achieve that crystallized convex hull via
correlated equilibrium. In game theory, the correlated equilibrium
set is convex, and it consists of the time-sharing mixed strategies
of the Nash equilibriums. In addition, the paper considers a
mechanism design approach to carefully design a utility function,
particularly the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction utility, where the
solution point is situated on the correlated equilibrium set. Finally,
the paper proposes a self learning algorithm, namely the regret-
matching algorithm, that converges to the solution point on the
correlated equilibrium set in a distributed fashion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless systems are becoming increasingly interference
limited rather than noise limited, attributed to the fact that the
cells are decreasing in size and the number of users within
a cell is increasing. Mitigating the impact of interference
between transmit-receive pairs is of great importance in order
to achieve higher data rates. Describing the complete capacity
region of the interference channel remains an open problem
in information theory [1]–[5]. For very strong interference,
successive cancellation schemes have to be applied, while
in the weak interference regime, treating the interference as
additive noise is optimal to within one bit [6]–[9]. Treating
the interference as noise, the n−user achievable rates region
has been found in [10] to be the convex hull of n hyper-
surfaces. The rates region bounded by these hyper-surfaces is
not necessarily convex, and hence a convex hull operation is
imposed through the strategy of time-sharing.
This paper adopts a novel approach into simplifying this
rates region in the n−dimensional space by having only On/Off
binary power control. Limiting each of the n transmitters to a
transmit power of either 0 or Pmax, this consequently leads to
2n−1 corner points within the rates region. And by forming a
convex hull through time-sharing between those corner points,
it thereby leads to what we denote a crystallized rates region.
Utility maximization using game-theoretic techniques has
recently received significant attention [11]–[15]. Most of the
existing game theoretic works are based on the concept of Nash
equilibrium [16]. However, the Nash equilibrium investigates
the individual payoff and might not be system efficient, i.e.
the performance of the game outcome could still be improved.
In 2005, Nobel Prize was awarded to Robert J. Aumann
for his contribution of proposing the concept of correlated
equilibrium [17]. Unlike Nash equilibrium in which each user
only considers its own strategy, correlated equilibrium achieves
better performance by allowing each user to consider the joint
distribution of the users’ actions. In other words, each user
needs to consider the others’ behaviors to see if there are mu-
tual benefits to explore [18]–[20]. Likewise, mechanism design
(including auction theory [21]) is a subfield of game theory that
studies how to design the game rule in order to achieve good
overall system performance [22], [23]. Mechanism design has
drawn recently a great attention in the research community,
especially after another Nobel Prize in 2007.
The paper presents three contributions with the following
structure:
1) Section II introduces the concept of crystallized rates
region with On/Off power control.
2) Section III applies the game theoretic concept of corre-
lated equilibrium (CE) to the rates region problem. The
CE exhibits the property of forming a convex set around
the 2n − 1 corner points, hence fitting suitably in the
crystallized rates region formulation.
3) Using mechanism design, Section IV presents an exam-
ple in applying these two concepts for the 2−user chan-
nel and formulates the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction
utility. To find the solution point distributively, the regret
matching learning algorithm is employed by virtue of its
property of converging to the correlated equilibrium set.
Section V demonstrates the ideas through simulation, and
Section VI draws the conclusions.
II. CRYSTALLIZED RATES REGION
A. System Model for 2−user Interference Channel
A 2−user interference channel is illustrated in Fig. 1. User
i transmits its signal Xi to the receiver Yi. The receiver front
end has additive thermal noise ni of variance σ2n. There is
no cooperation at the transmit, nor at the receive side. The
channel is flat fading. For brevity a, b, c, and d represent
the channel power gain normalized by the noise variance.
Explicitly, a = |g1,1|2/σ2n, b = |g2,1|2/σ2n, c = |g2,2|2/σ2n,
and d = |g1,2|2/σ2n, where gi,j is the channel gain from the
ith transmitter to the jth receiver. User i transmits with power
Pi, and it has a maximum power constraint of Pmax.
In an effort to keep the complexity of the receivers fairly
simple, the interference is treated as noise. Such case is encoun-
tered in sensor networks and in cellular communication where
Fig. 1: 2−user interference channel
it is desired to have low power-consuming and correspondingly
low complexity receivers. Therefore, with the power vector
P = [P1, P2]
T
, treating the interference as noise the achievable
rates for the 2−user interference channel are:
R1(P) = log2
(
1 + aP1
1 + bP2
)
;
R2(P) = log2
(
1 + cP2
1 + dP1
)
.
(1)
B. The Achievable Rates Region Treating Interference as Noise
In [10] the achievable rates region for the general n−user
channel, treating the interference as noise, is found to be the
convex hull of the union of n hyper-surfaces. Each hyper-
surface is characterized by holding one of the transmitter
constant at a full power while the other transmitters sweep all
their power range, hence forming a hyper-surface as a result.
There are n transmitters, resulting in n hyper-surfaces, onto
which the convex hull operation is performed.
The convexity or concavity behavior of these hyper-surface
frontiers is complex. A rates region set is convex whenever it
entirely encloses a straight line formed by connecting any two
points within the rates region. As a result when the rates region
is convex, its outerbound hyper-surface frontiers are concave,
and vice versa.
For the 2−user channel, see Fig. 2, the hyper-surfaces are
the two frontiers: ΦAB = Φ(:, Pmax), characterized by holding
P2 = Pmax and P1 sweeps all its power range from 0 to Pmax,
and ΦBC = Φ(Pmax, :) characterized by holding P1 = Pmax
and P2 sweeps all its power range from 0 to Pmax. These
frontiers are referred to as potential lines given that each is
characterized by holding one the transmit power arguments at
a constant value, in this case Pmax, while the other power
argument spans the whole power range.
These potential lines are concave in noise-limited regimes
(thus enclosing a convex rates region) as in Fig. 2-a, and they
shift towards convexity as the interference increases, as in
Fig. 2-d. In cases with moderate interference levels, they can
exhibit non-stationary inflection point, as at point D in Fig.2-b.
C. Crystallized Rates Region
The crystallized rates region approach approximates the
achievable rates region formed by the potential lines ΦAB and
ΦBC into the convex time-sharing hull of the straight lines
connecting points A, B, and C. Denoting Φ(P1, P2) the point
in the rates region achieved when user 1 transmits at P1 and
user 2 transmits at P2 in Eq. (1): point A is Φ(0, Pmax) where
only user 2 transmits at full power and user 1 is silent, point B
is Φ(Pmax, Pmax) where both users transmit simultaneously at
full power, and point C is Φ(Pmax, 0) where user 1 transmits at
full power and user 2 is silent. Hence, we refer by binary power
control such mechanism of operation in producing points A, B,
and C. We denote such points that are formed by binary power
control as the corner points of the rates region. In the 2−user
interference channel, there exist 3 corner points, similarly in
the n−user case there exist 2n − 1 corner points.
Therefore, this paper simplifies the analysis of the rates
region in the n−dimensional space to just focus on finding
the convex time-sharing hull onto the 2n − 1 corner points,
forming the crystallized rates region. In the 2−user dimension,
these are straight time-sharing lines connecting two points; in
the 3−user dimension, these are a set of polygon surfaces each
connecting three points, see Fig. 3.
D. System Time-sharing Coefficients and Rates Equations
Instead of a power control problem in finding Pi, the
problem becomes finding the appropriate time-sharing coef-
ficients of the 2n − 1 corner points. For the 2−user case, let
θ= [θ1, θ2, θ3]
T
,
∑
i θi = 1, denote the system time-sharing
coefficients vector of the respective corner points Φ(Pmax, 0)
(user 1 transmitting only with a time-sharing coefficient θ1),
Φ(0, Pmax) (user 2 transmitting only with a time-sharing
coefficient θ2), and Φ(Pmax, Pmax) (both users transmitting
with a time-sharing coefficient θ3). The reason θ is labeled
a system time-sharing coefficients vector is to emphasize the
combinatorial element in constructing the corner points, where
the cardinality of |θ| = 2n − 1.
Then for 2−user case, in contrast with Eq. (1), the new
crystallized rates equations for R1 and R2 are:
R1(θ) = θ1 log2(1 + aPmax) + θ3 log2
(
1 + aPmax
1 + bPmax
)
R2(θ) = θ2 log2(1 + cPmax) + θ3 log2
(
1 + cPmax1 + dPmax
)
(2)
Any solution point on the crystallized frontier would lie
somewhere on the time-sharing line connecting two points for
the 2−user case; and similarly for the 3−user case, the solution
point lies somewhere on a time-sharing plane connecting three
points, then by deduction we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 1: The system time-sharing vector θ, for any
solution point on the n−user crystallized rates region, has at
maximum n nonzero coefficients out of its 2n − 1 elements.
E. Evaluation of Crystallization
Examining the crystallized rates region in more details for
the 2−user interference channel, we evaluate the area of the
rates region bounded by the potential lines ΦAB and ΦBC
achieved through power control, and the area of the rates region
formed by time-sharing points A, B, and C. In effect, we are
evaluating how much gain or loss results from completely
replacing the traditional power control scheme (see Eq. (1))
with the time-sharing scheme between the corner points (see
Eq. (2)). For this purpose we consider the symmetric channel,
where a = 1, and we increase the interference b to vary the
signal to interference ratio SIR = a/b from 20dB to −20dB.
The value of the area bounded by the power control potential
lines is plotted in Fig.4 together with the value of the area
bounded by the time-sharing scheme through the point B (
formed by the time-sharing lines A-B and B-C). In addition,
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Fig. 2: 2−user rates region: (a) noise-limited, concave frontiers (ΦAB ,ΦBC); (b) frontier (ΦAB) with inflection-point; (c) convex
(ΦAB) and concave (ΦBC ) frontiers; (d) interference-limited, convex frontiers (ΦAB ,ΦBC ).
Fig. 3: 3−user crystallized rates region: (a) time-sharing crystallized hull,(b) crystallized hull overlaid on top of the rates region
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Fig. 4: Area of the rates region achieved through power control
or through time-sharing versus interference
for reference, the area confined by the time-sharing line A-C
is plotted, which does not depend on the SIR.
For weak interference, or equivalently noise-limited regime,
point B is used in constructing the crystallized region. As the
interference increases beyond a certain threshold level, time-
sharing through point B becomes suboptimal, and time-sharing
A-C becomes optimal. The exact switching point from power
control to time-sharing has been found in [10]. In Fig. 4,
this happens at the intersection of the blue line (with circle
markers) and the A-C dotted line. As indicated in Fig. 4, there
is no significant loss in the rates region area if time-sharing is
used universally instead of traditional power control, in fact in
some cases time-sharing offers considerable gain. Specifically,
whenever the potential lines exhibit concavity, time-sharing
loses to power control; whenever the potential lines exhibit
convexity, time-sharing gains over power control. Different
values of a also lead to the same conclusion.
In Fig. 5 the percentage of the rates region gain (or loss)
in using the time-sharing scheme (through point B) over
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Fig. 5: Gain (or loss) percentage from using time-sharing
through point B over power control
the power control scheme is plotted for the same symmetric
channel examined in Fig. 4. The loss does not exceed 1%,
and the time-sharing strategy is therefore quite attractive. For
illustration purposes, note that the x-axis in Fig. 5 was chosen
to span the interference range of −20dB to 0dB; whereas in
Fig. 4 the x-axis interference range was from −20dB to 20dB.
If we were to plot the x-axis in Fig. 5 up to 20dB instead of the
0dB, the percentage gain would have reached on the y-axis up
to 800%. Note that for high interference time-sharing through
point B is suboptimal and time-sharing A-C is optimal, so the
gain over power control is even larger.
III. CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM FOR CRYSTALLIZED
INTERFERENCE CHANNEL
The crystallized rates region offers a good alternative to
form the rates region of the n−user interference channel with
marginal loss, and sometimes significant gain (especially for
interference-limited regimes). Therefore the problem revolves
around finding the convex hull over the set of polygons
connecting the 2n − 1 corner points. One technique explored
to achieve the convex hull is through the concept of correlated
equilibrium in game theory.
A. Correlated Equilibrium
Every user i has a transmit strategy αi of either 0 or Pmax.
Ui is the utility of user i. Nash equilibrium is a well-known
concept to analyze the outcome of a game which states that
in the equilibrium every user will select a utility-maximizing
strategy given the strategies of every other user.
Definition 1: Nash equilibrium achieving strategy α∗i of user
i is defined as:
Ui(α
∗
i ,α−i) ≥ Ui(αi,α−i), ∀i, ∀αi ∈ Ωi (3)
where αi is any possible strategy of user i, α−i is the strategy
vector of all other users except user i, and Ωi is the strategy
space {0, Pmax}. In other words, given the other users’ actions,
no user can increase its utility alone by changing its own action.
Next the concept of the correlated equilibrium is studied.
It is more general than the Nash equilibrium and it was
first proposed in [17]. The idea is that a strategy profile
is chosen according to the joint distribution instead of the
marginal distribution of users strategies. When converging to
the recommended strategy, it is to the users’ best interests
to conform to this strategy. The distribution is called the
correlated equilibrium, which is defined as:
Definition 2: A probability distribution p is a correlated
equilibrium of a game, if and only if, for all i, αi ∈ Ωi, and
α−i ∈ Ω−i,∑
α
−i∈Ω−i
p(α∗i ,α−i)[Ui(α
∗
i ,α−i)−Ui(αi,α−i)] ≥ 0, ∀αi ∈ Ωi.
(4)
Ω−i denotes the strategy space of all the users other than user i.
As every user j, j 6= i, has a possible 0 or Pmax strategy choice,
then the cardinality of Ω−i is |Ω−i| = 2(n−1). Therefore
the summation in Eq. (4) have 2n−1 summation terms. The
summation over α−i generates the marginal expectation. The
inequality (4) means that when the recommendation to user i
is to choose action α∗i , then choosing action αi instead of α∗i
cannot result in a higher expected payoff to user i. It is worth
to point out that the probability distribution p is a joint point
mass function (pmf) of the different combinations of the n
users strategies. Therefore, p is the joint pmf of the resulting 2n
system strategy points. Discounting the trivial system strategy
of all the users transmitting at 0, there exist 2n − 1 system
strategy points that we wish to find their pmfs.
B. CE in the Context of the Crystallized Rates Region
Revisiting Subsection II-D, the 2n− 1 point mass functions
that we want to find are the system time-sharing coefficients
θk, k = 1, . . . , 2
n − 1. We can index those 2n − 1 pmfs
to the corresponding θk in any bijective one-to-one mapping.
Index k can denote the base-2 representation of the binary
users’ strategies (starting with user 1’s binary action as the
least significant bit). For example, let α(1)i denotes that user
i transmits with αi = Pmax, and α(0)i denotes that user i is
silent with αi = 0. In Subsection II-D, θ1 was mapped to user
1 transmitting, equivalently θ1 = p(α(1)1 , α
(0)
2 ) = pΦ(Pmax,0);
where we defined explicitly pΦ(Pmax,0) as the point mass
function of the point Φ(Pmax, 0). And similarly θ3 was mapped
to both users transmitting, θ3 = p(α(1)1 , α
(1)
2 ) = pΦ(Pmax,Pmax).
Morever, by definition,
∑
α p(α) =
∑(2n−1)
k=1 θk = 1, and as
discussed in Corollary I, the solution point possesses at most
n nonzero pmfs in the joint distribution p.
The correlated equilibriums set is nonempty, closed and con-
vex in every finite game [17]. In fact, every Nash equilibrium
and mixed (i.e. time-sharing) strategy of Nash equilibriums are
within the correlated equilibrium set, and the Nash equilibrium
correspond to the special case where p(α) is a product of each
individual user’s probability for different actions, i.e., the play
of the different users is independent [17], [23].
IV. MECHANISM DESIGN AND LEARNING ALGORITHM
There are two major challenges to implement correlated
equilibrium for rate optimization over the interference channel.
First, to ensure the system converges to the desired point (such
as time-sharing between A-C instead of going through point
B in Fig. 2 (d)). As an example, we considered an auction
utility function from mechanism design. Second, to achieve
the equilibrium, a distributive solution is desirable, where we
propose the self-learning regret matching algorithm.
A. Mechanism Designed Utility
One important mechanism design is the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) auction [21] which imposes cost to resolve the
conflicts between users. Using the basic idea of VCG, where
we want to maximize Ui, ∀i, the user utility Ui is designed to
be the rate Ri minus a payment cost function ζi as
Ui , Ri − ζi. (5)
The payment cost of user i is expressed as the performance
loss of all other users due to the inclusion of user i, explicitly:
ζi(α) =
∑
j 6=i
Rj (α−i)−
∑
j 6=i
Rj (αi) . (6)
Hence if αi is 0 for user i, it is equivalent to user i being
absent, consequently the cost ζi = 0 whenever αi = 0. For
the 2−user case, focusing on ζ1 when α1 = Pmax, hence: a)
if α2 = 0, then R2 = 0 and ζ1 = 0; b) if α2 = Pmax, then:
ζ1(α1 = Pmax, α2 = Pmax)
= R2(α1 = 0, α2 = Pmax)−R2(α1 = Pmax, α2 = Pmax)
= log2
(
1 + cPmax)− log2(1 +
cPmax
1 + dPmax
)
= log2
(
1 +
cdP 2max
1 + cPmax + dPmax
)
.
ζ2 follows by symmetry. As a result, the VCG utilities for the
2−user channel are summarized in Table I, where
U ′1 = log2(1 +
aPmax
1 + bPmax
)− log2
(
1 +
cdP 2max
1 + cPmax + dPmax
)
U ′2 = log2(1 +
cPmax
1 + dPmax
)− log2
(
1 +
abP 2max
1 + aPmax + bPmax
)
Notice that each user pays the cost because of its involve-
ment. This cost function can be calculated and exchanged
before transmission with little signalling overhead.
TABLE I: 2−user VCG {U1, U2} utility table
α2 = 0 α2 = Pmax
α1 = 0 {0, 0} {0, log2(1 + cPmax)}
α1 = Pmax {log2(1 + aPmax), 0} {U
′
1, U
′
2}
B. The Regret-Matching Algorithm
Finally, we exhibit the regret-matching algorithm [23] to
learn in a distributive fashion how to achieve the correlated
equilibrium set in solving the VCG auction. The algorithm
is named regret-matching (no-regret) algorithm, because the
stationary solution of the learning algorithm exhibits no regret
and the probability to take an action is proportional to the
“regrets” for not having played the other actions. Specifically,
for user i there are two distinct binary actions α(0)i and α
(1)
i
at every time t = T (where α(0)i = 0, and α(1)i = Pmax). The
regret R of user i at time T for playing action α(1)i instead of
the other action α(0)i is
R
T
i (α
(1)
i , α
(0)
i ) := max{D
T
i (α
(1)
i , α
(0)
i ), 0}, (7)
where
DTi (α
(1)
i , α
(0)
i ) =
1
T
∑
t≤T
[U ti (α
(0)
i ,α−i)− U
t
i (α
(1)
i ,α−i)].
(8)
Here U ti (α
(·)
i ,α−i) is the utility at time t and α−i is other
users’ actions. DTi (α
(1)
i , α
(0)
i ) has the interpretation of average
payoff that user i would have obtained if it had played action
α
(0)
i every time in the past instead of choosing α
(1)
i . The
expression RTi (α
(1)
i , α
(0)
i ) can be viewed as a measure of the
average regret. Similarly, RTi (α
(0)
i , α
(1)
i ) represents the average
regret if the alternative action has been taken.
Recalling the discussion in Subsection III-B about the map-
ping notation we adopted between the point mass functions
p(α
(·)
1 , α
(·)
2 ) and the system time-sharing coefficients (θs), then
we want to find the point mass function p(α(1)1 , α
(0)
2 ) ≡ θ1,
p(α
(0)
1 , α
(1)
2 ) ≡ θ2, and p(α
(1)
1 , α
(1)
2 ) ≡ θ3. As discussed in
Subsection II-D there exist 2n = 4 pmfs for the 2−user case.
For the trivial case of the origin point Φ(0, 0), p(α(0)1 , α
(0)
2 ) =
0. We are left to obtain p(α(1)1 , α
(0)
2 ), p(α
(0)
1 , α
(1)
2 ), and
p(α
(1)
1 , α
(1)
2 ). Specifically‡ to the 2−user case, this simplifies
further to finding only two variables. Denoting p1 = θ1, and
p2 = θ2, then θ3 can be deduced as θ3 = 1− p1 − p2.
The details of the regret-matching algorithm is shown in
Table II. The probability pi is a linear function of the regret, see
Eq. (9). The algorithm has a complexity of O(|Ωi|) = O(2).
By using the theorem in [23], if every user plays according
to the learning algorithm in Table II, the adaptive learning
algorithm has the property that the probability distribution
found converges on the set of correlated equilibrium. It has
been shown that the set of correlated equilibrium is nonempty,
closed and convex [17]. Therefore, by using the algorithm in
‡Note: Solving for n variables instead of 2n − 1 does not apply to n ≥ 3;
the 2−user case is a special case, as
∑
2
n−1=3
k=1
θk = 1 was used to simplify
the unknowns to 2. For n ≥ 3, see Fig.3, it is not enough to find the time-
sharing strategy of individual users, as ordering needs to come into the picture
in arriving to the desired system time-sharing coefficients.
TABLE II: Regret-matching learning algorithm
Initialize arbitrarily probability for user i, pi.
For t=2,3,4,...
1. Let αt−1i be the action last chosen by user i, and αˆ
t−1
i
as the other action.
2. Find Dt−1i (α
t−1
i , αˆ
t−1
i ) as in Eq. (8).
3. Find average regret Rt−1i (α
t−1
i , αˆ
t−1
i ) as in Eq. (7).
4. Then the probability distribution of the actions for
the next period, pti is defined as:
pti(αˆ
t−1
i ) =
1
µ
R
t−1
i (α
t−1
i , αˆ
t−1
i ),
pti(α
t−1
i ) = 1− p
t
i(αˆ
t−1
i ),
(9)
where µ is a certain constant that is sufficiently large.
Table II, we can guarantee that the algorithm converges to the
set of CE as T →∞.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
To demonstrate the proposed scheme, we setup a 2−user
interference channel where Pmax = 1. In Fig. 6, we show
the crystallized rates region for the noise-limited regime with
a = 2, b = 0.2, c = 1, and d = 0.1. The learning algorithm
converges close to the Nash equilibrium, which means that
both users transmit with maximum power Pmax all the time.
This corresponds to the case in Fig. 2 (a). In Fig. 7, we show
the Type II time-sharing case with a = 20, b = 2, c = 1, and
d = 1. The algorithm converges to θ2 = 0.92 and θ3 = 0.08,
which means the probability that user 2 transmits alone is 0.92,
and the probability that both users transmit with full power is
0.08. This corresponds to the case in Fig. 2 (c). Finally, in Fig.
8, we show the interference-limited regime with c = 1, d = 10
as well as seven different instances of a and b. First, the Nash
equilibriums exhibit much poorer performance than the TDMA
time-sharing lines. The proposed learning algorithm converges
to a point on the TDMA time-sharing lines, this corresponds to
the case in Fig. 2 (d). Moreover, the learning algorithm favors
the weaker user.
In Fig. 9, we show the interference-limited case with a =
1, b = 10, c = 1, and d = 10. Due to the symmetry, the learning
algorithm achieves probabilities of 0.5, which means the two
users conduct equal time-sharing over the channel, where each
transmits solely at full power while the other is silent; and such
two transmission states happen equally 50% of the time each.
This corresponds to the A-C time-sharing case in Fig. 2 (d).
VI. CONCLUSION
Treating the interference as noise, the paper proposes a
novel approach to the rates region in the n−user interference
channel, composed by the time-sharing convex hull of 2n − 1
corner points achieved through On/Off binary power control.
The resulting rates region is denoted crystallized rates region.
It then applies the concept of correlated equilibrium from
game theory to form the convex hull of the crystallized
region. An example in applying these concepts for the 2−user
case, the paper considered a mechanism design approach to
design the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction utility function. The
regret-matching algorithm is used to converge to the solution
point on the correlated equilibrium set, to which subsequently
simulation was presented.
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Fig. 6: Noise-limited: 2−user case
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